We consider the amount of randomness used in private distributed computations. Speci cally, we show how n players can compute the exclusive-or (xor) of n boolean inputs t-privately, using only O(t 2 log(n=t)) random bits (the best known upper bound is O(tn)). We accompany this result by a lower bound on the number of random bits required to carry out this task; we show that any protocol solving this problem requires at least t random bits (again, this signi cantly improves over the known lower bounds).
Introduction
There has been a great e ort devoted to the study of randomization. Initially, the main application of randomization was for solving problems to which deterministic solutions are impossible (e.g., in distributed http://moon.math.tau.ac.il/ mansour) computing and in cryptography) or unknown (e.g., e cient primality testing). Furthermore, randomization is used to construct both more e cient and, not less signi cant, much simpler algorithms.
Randomness as a resource was extensively studied in the last decade. One line of research was devoted to a quantitative study of the role of randomness in speci c contexts, e.g., RS89, KPU88, BGG90, CG90, BGS94, BSV94, KR94]; another direction was developing general-purpose methods for saving random bits. These methods range over pseudo-random generators Y82, BM84, N90], techniques for re-cycling random bits IZ89, CW89] , sources of weak randomness CG85, VV85, Z91], and construction of various kinds of small probability spaces NN90, AGHP90, S92, KM93, KM94b, KK94]. A particular goal was to allow derandomization; i.e., to completely eliminate the use of randomness. For some problems, the best known deterministic algorithms are randomized algorithm which are latter derandomized (see, e.g., KM94a]).
We consider the role of randomness in t-private protocols. Informally, a t-private protocol P for computing a function f is a protocol that allows n players, P i (1 i n), each holding an individual secret input, x i , to compute the value of f(x) in a way that no coalition of at most t players learns about the initial inputs of other players more than what is revealed by the value of f(x) and their own inputs. The players are assumed to be honest but curious; namely, they all follow the prescribed protocol P but they could try to get additional information from the messages they receive during the execution of the protocol. The study of private computations in this setting was initiated by BGW88, CCD88] and was the subject of a considerable amount of work, e.g., BB89, CK89, K89, B89, FY92, CK92, CGK90, CGK92, KMO94, KOR96].
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The use of randomness is a crucial ingredient in private protocols; without randomness only degenerate functions can be computed privately.
The xor (exclusive-or) function (and more generally, modular sum function) is a basic building block in all private-protocols. As a result (and due to its relative simplicity), the task of computing xor t-privately was the subject of previous research FY92, CK92, KR94, BDPV95]. We investigate the amount of randomness required to compute the exclusive-or of n input bits t-privately. The known upper bound uses O(tn) random bits. Better upper bounds were known only for the case t = 1 (see KR94]), in which a single random bit is sucient. As for lower bounds, Blundo et. al. BDPV95] proved that if t n ? c (for some constant c) then (n 2 ) random bits are required and if t (2 ? p 2)n then (n) bits are required. For smaller values of t it was only known that no deterministic protocol for this task exists.
We signi cantly improve both the upper bound and the lower bound for this problem. We present a protocol for this task that uses only O(t 2 log(n=t)) random bits. On the other hand, we prove that any t-private protocol for xor requires at least t random bits. This is the best known lower bound for most values of t (i.e., excluding the case where t is very close to n).
For our upper bound, we develop a new construction of small sample spaces that naturally generalizes k-wise independent sample spaces, and sample spaces of the type studied by Schulman S92] .
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More precisely, given subsets T 1 ; : : :; T m f1; : : :; ng we look for a small sample space in which the parity of the variables in every T j gets the values 0 and 1 with equal probability, i.e. 1=2. We present a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm that allows constructing such a space for any collection of such subsets (in particular, it is important for our application that there is no restriction on the size of the sets). This is a uniform space 3 whose size is linear in m (2m vectors). We also show how to nd such spaces in parallel (in NC).
Relation to Other Work
The abovementioned result of S92] was generalized in various ways KM93, KM94b, KK94]. In particular, 2 Schulman S92] initiated the study of sample spaces that satisfy a list of speci c independence constraints. He showed that if we are interested in having n random variables such that only m subsets H 1 ; : :: ; Hm of them, each of size at most k, will behave uniformly, then one can get a sample space of size O(m2 k ) (in particular, if k = O(logn) then the sample space is of polynomial size).
3 I.e., a space that consists of a set S and the uniform distribution over S. Karger and Koller KK94] , presented a construction that can handle parity requirements as in our work. However, there is a signi cant di erence between their construction (as well as those in KM93, KM94b] ) and the construction presented in this paper: our construction builds a uniform sample space while the constructions of KM93, KM94b, KK94] build a nonuniform sample spaces (i.e., each s 2 S is selected with a di erent probability p s ). While non-uniformity does not matter if the goal is derandomization, it has many disadvantages if we have other applications in mind. In particular, if we want to sample in the space then non-uniform sample spaces may not be useful for saving random bits (the goal of the current paper):
for sampling in a uniform space dlog 2 jSje random bits are enough, while for sampling in a non-uniform space we may need much more, and in some cases will not be able to create exactly the same distribution (see KY76] ). Sampling is needed if, for example, we do not want to pay the jSj penalty in the running-time involved with derandomizing an algorithm but just want to run the algorithm once. In such a case a nonuniform space does not necessarily reduce the number of random bits required.
In addition, as mentioned, randomness is not only used for achieving e cient algorithms. For example, in cryptographic protocols randomness is used to maintain the secrecy of information. In such applications, we cannot completely eliminate the use of randomness while maintaining the secrecy so we are just interested in reducing the number of random bits used. For such applications, other constructions such as -bias (uniform) sample spaces NN90, AGHP90] are not useful, as they only guarantee that parities are \almost" balanced. In cryptographic settings this could mean information leakage.
Organization
In Section 2 we present the construction of small sample spaces required for our results (its parallel version appears in Appendix A and other extensions appear in Appendix B). In Section 3 we study the question of randomness in private computations. The upper bound, that builds on the construction of small sample spaces, appears in Section 3.2, while the lower bound appears in Section 3.3. (Section 3.1 includes some required de nitions.) 2 Constructing Small Spaces Immune to Parity Tests
Preliminaries
Let S f0; 1g n be a collection of (not necessarily distinct) binary vectors of length n. We denote by s 2 R S a choice of an element of S uniformly at random. The distribution generated by S is the distribution induced by picking s 2 R S.
We say that a set S is immune to a parity-test T f1; : : :; ng if, Pr s2RS i2T s i = 1] = 1 2 : Informally, this means that when considering the distribution generated by S, the parity of variables in T is unbiased, i.e. the probability that the parity is 0 (or 1) is exactly 1=2. Let T 1 ; : : :; T m be m (nonempty) subsets of f1; 2; : : :; ng. A set S is immune to T 1 ; : : :; T m if it is immune to each T i .
In the sequel whenever there are operations between elements of f0; 1g n they are done in GF(2 n ). Proof: We need to show that the probability of the parity of the bits in T i to be zero is exactly 1=2. Note that the parity of the bits of the vector Mṽ T whose indices are in T i is simply 1 Ti Mṽ T , where 1 Ti stands for the characteristic vector of the set T i . Since P j2Ti M j 6 =0, then 1 Ti M =ũ, whereũ 6 =0. The probability that the parity of the bits in T i is zero is the probability that hũ;ṽi = 0, whereṽ 2 f0; 1g`. Sinceũ 6 =0, this probability is exactly 1=2.
Using this lemma, we reduce the problem of constructing a space which is immune to T 1 ; : : :; T m to the problem of constructing a matrix M such that the rows corresponding to each T i do not sum up tõ 0. We call such a matrix M good. All our constructions make use of this observation; i.e., their aim is to nd a good matrix M.
Randomized Construction
Here we present a randomized construction of immune spaces. While a randomized construction is not very useful in the applications, this construction exhibits the possibility of nding such spaces.
Let`= dlog me + k, for some parameter k. The construction is simply to select a random 0?1 matrix M of size n `. Note that the construction depends on the number of sets, m, but it does not depend on the speci c sets. Also note that space(M) is of size at most 2 m 2 k and that to verify that the randomly chosen matrix M is good takes polynomial-time (in n and m). Proof: For convenience, we view the construction as selecting at random, one-by-one, the n rows of the matrix M 1 ; : : :; M n 2 f0; 1g`. Fix a set T i f1; : : :; ng and denote by t the maximal element in T i .
By Lemma 1, it is enough that X j2Ti M j 6 =0:
Consider, the t-th step in the construction of M, when M 1 ; : : :; M t?1 were already xed. The only row in the above sum that still should be chosen is M t and there is exactly one choice, among the 2`possibilities, that will make this sum equal0. Hence, the probability of failure for T i is 1 2` 1 m2 k . Therefore, the probability that there exists a set T i for which we fail is at most m times larger, i.e. at most 1=2 k .
Deterministic Construction
In this section we describe a deterministic construction. The idea is similar to what we did in the randomized case, but instead of choosing the rows at random we will construct them deterministically entry-by-entry. This time the construction does look at the speci c sets T 1 ; : : :; T m in question. Let`= dlog(m + 1)e.
For k = 1; : : :; n construct the k-th row of M as follows:
We say that a set T i is relevant for the k-th step if k is the maximal element of T i . The goal in the k-th step is to make sure that each of the relevant sets has the property that P j2Ti M j 6 =0 (the fact that the set is relevant means that k is the only row in the sum that was not xed yet). For each of these sets there is exactly one value (in f0; 1g`) for the row that violates this property (i.e., with this value P j2Ti M j =0). This implies that there are at most m illegal choices for the k-th row. However, there are 2` m + 1 possible values for this row hence at least one of them satis es the property with respect to all relevant sets.
Lemma 3: The above algorithm constructs in time poly(n; m) a matrix M such that space(M) is immune to all sets T 1 ; : : :; T m .
Proof: The correctness follows from the above discussion (particularly, the choice of`and Lemma 1). The time complexity is obvious.
In the appendices we discuss various extensions of our construction and its relationship to previous constructions.
Privacy
In this section we consider the problem of computing xor t-privately. We prove bounds on the (total) number of random bits used by the n players in order to perform this task. We rst present the upper bound (Section 3.2) for which we use the results of the previous section. Then (in Section 3.3) we give a lower bound for this problem. We start with some required de nitions.
Preliminaries
A set of n players, P 1 ; : : :; P n , each possessing a single bit x i (known only to P i ), collaborate in a protocol to compute xor (i.e., (x 1 ; : : :; x n )). Each player may toss coins during the protocol. We formalize this as follows: the player P i holds an in nite tape R i of random bits. The number of random bits he uses is the position of the rightmost cell read by the player on his tape. The number of random bits used by the protocol is the total number of bits used by all players (note that in di erent executions P i may use di erent number of bits). The randomness complexity is the worst case (over all inputs and all executions) number of random bits.
Next, we de ne the notion of privacy (we follow, e.g., BGW88, CK89]). For a set of players T (sometimes called a coalition), denote by C T the communication seen by the players in T (i.e., all message they receive during the execution of the protocol). A protocol is said to be t-private if every coalition T of size at most t sees the same distribution of communication on inputs that look the same for players in T. Formally, for every two inputsx andỹ such that xor(x) = xor(ỹ) and x i = y i for all i 2 T, for every sequence of messages C, and for every choice of random tapes R i for players in T, the protocol satis es
where the probability ranges over the random tapes of the players not in T.
To simplify the presentation, we also consider a non-standard model in which, in addition to the n players P 1 ; : : :; P n , there is some trusted party Q. This party has a multi-set of vectors S which are just strings in n for some set . The trusted party participates in the protocol in a very restricted way: Q rst tosses some coins and use their outcome to pick a random string from S; he then sends to P i the i-th coordinate of that vector (the P i 's have no other source of randomness); the players P 1 ; : : :; P n proceed without receiving any more messages from Q. 4 We assume that each vector in S has a positive probability to be picked, and we call the set S the support of Q.
The notion of t-privacy is de ned in a way similar to the standard model, but here the de nition is somewhat simpler since we assume that Q does not participate in any coalition (he is a trusted party) and also all other players do not toss coins. That is, for every T fP 1 ; : : :; P n g, everyx;ỹ as above and every sequence of messages C, the protocol satis es
where the probability ranges over the random choices made by Q (and C T includes the random bits received from Q by players in T).
Upper Bound
In this section we present a t-private protocol which computes xor while using small amount of random bits. We rst show how, in the trusted-party model, t-private computation of xor can be performed using only O(t log(n=t)) random bits. Then, we modify the protocol to work in the standard model (where no such trusted party exists) with a penalty of O(t) in the randomness complexity. Namely, we use O(t 2 log(n=t)) random bits (compared to the previously known upper bound which is O(tn)). We start with the protocol in the trusted-party model. We rst assume that the trusted party Q uses random bits which are uniformly distributed and completely independent. We will analyze this protocol and as a result note that for the proof to go through much weaker requirements regarding the random bits are needed. These requirements are of the type satis ed by the sample spaces constructed above and hence Q will be able to choose its random bits from such a space. The protocol goes as follows:
1. Q chooses at random n ? 1 random bits z 1 ; : : :; z n?1 . He sends z i to P i (1 i n ? 1).
In addition, he sends z n = P n?1 i=1 z i to P n . and it sends the result, m i , to P i+1 . Similarly, in the n-th round, P n computes m n = m n?1 + x n + z n and announces m n as the output.
A simple induction shows that, for 1 i n ? 1, the message m i sent by P i satis es:
This, together with the fact that z n = P n?1 i=1 z i implies that m n = m n?1 + x n + z n = P n j=1 x j and so the protocol is always correct. It remains to prove the privacy of the protocol. Namely, that every coalition, given the output of the protocol and the input of coalition members, sees the same distribution of communication. We distinguish between two types of coalitions, depending on whether or not P n is in the coalition. Consider a coalition T = fi 1 ; i 2 ; : : :; i p g, of 5 all additions are modulo 2. 6 The rst player P 1 has to sum only z 1 and x 1 as he receives no other message. Alternatively, de ne m 0 = 0. size p t, which does not include P n . The view of this coalition, consists of the random bits z i1 ; : : :; z ip they received from Q in the rst step of the protocol, and of messages m j1 ; : : :; m jr (r t) sent from players not in the coalition to players in the coalition. We claim that, for allx, each assignment of values to these p+r messages is obtained with probability 1=2 p+r . Since this is true for allx, the privacy with respect to this kind of coalitions follows. For each player P jk = 2 T that sends a message to a member of the coalition, denote by P i(jk) the last player of the coalition before him (formally, i(j k ) is the maximum value which is smaller than j k and P i(jk) 2 T; if no such index exists then i(j k ) = 0). Now, we can express each message m jk as m i(jk) + P jk i=i(jk)+1 x i + P jk i=i(jk)+1 z i , where the last sum is denoted by Y jk . Clearly, givenx, the values of z i1 ; : : :; z ip and Y j1 ; : : :; Y jr are completely determined by the view of T. Since each of these p+r values depends on di erent z i 's they are all equally distributed and independent. Therefore, every communication has probability 1=2 p+r , as claimed.
The case of coalitions that include the player P n is similar. There, however, the value of the message z n received by P n is already determined by the other elements of the view and the output. Hence, each communication which is consistent with the output has probability of 1=2 p?1+r .
By the above analysis, it is already clear how to de ne the sets to which the sample space should be immune: for every 1 i j n ? 1, let T i;j = fi; : : :; jg. This guarantees that each z ij is uniformly distributed (as we have the singleton T ij;ij as a special case) and so is each Y jk (as it is the parity corresponding to the set T i(jk)+1;jk ). To get the independence among these p+r 2t values, it is su cient to consider 7 the collection T of all sets which are composed from taking unions of at most 2t disjoint sets as above. Each such union has at most 2t intervals, therefore the number of sets in T can be bounded by jT j P 2t i=0
? n 2i = ( n t ) O(t) . In other words, we replace step (1) of the above protocol by: 1'. Q chooses, using O(logjT j) = O(t log(n=t)) random bits, a vectorz = z 1 ; : : :; z n?1 from a space which is immune to the sets in T . He sends z i to P i (1 i n ? 1) and z n = P n?1 i=1 z i to P n . The same proofs of correctness and privacy remain valid. Hence, we have just proved, Theorem 1: There exists an n-party, t-private protocol in the trusted-party model to compute xor using O(t log(n=t)) random bits.
To transform the above protocol to the standard model, we let the players P 1 ; : : :; P t simulate the role of Q. That is, we replace (1') by the following: 1". Each P j (1 j t) chooses, using O(t log(n=t)) random bits, a vectorz j = z j 1 ; : : :; z j n?1 from a space which is immune to the sets in T . Player P j sends z j i to P i (1 i n ? 1) and z j n = P n?1 i=1 z j i to P n . Each P i computes z i = P t j=1 z j i . The key observation now is that if the coalition is P 1 ; : : :; P t then the coalition gets no messages (from non-coalition players) during the protocol and hence gets no additional information. For any other coalition, there exists at least one player P m , 1 m t, whose random string is not known to the coalition. The same proof above, regarding the distribution of communications, can be repeated using only the choices of P m in the argument. To conclude, we have proved:
Theorem 2: There exists an n-party, t-private protocol to compute xor using O(t 2 log(n=t)) random bits.
Remark: Note that the size of the sets T i;j de ned above may be very large (up to n?1), hence the sample spaces of S92] are not enough. It should also be clear that just by using a t-wise independent sample space the protocol fails. This is because large sets of variables may be dependent and hence their sum (i.e., the Y jk 's) is not equally distributed.
Lower Bound
In this section we prove the lower bound for the privacy problem. Again, we rst consider the trustedparty model. We start with a simple combinatorial lemma.
Lemma 4: Let S be a set of at most K distinct vectors of n coordinates. Then, there are k = blogKc coordinates, and an assignment to these k coordinates such that there is a unique vectors 2 S which is consistent with this assignment.
Proof: The proof is by induction on K. It can be easily veri ed for small values of K (e.g., K = 2; 3). Now, given a set S, we nd a coordinate i in which not all the vectors have the same value. Choose this coordinate, and take a value which appears in at most half of the vectors (but does appear at least once). After this we are left with at most K=2 vectors and, by induction hypothesis, we can x blog(K=2)c = k?1 more coordinates. We are now ready to show the lower bound theorem for the trusted party model.
Theorem 3: Let P be a protocol for n 3 players that allows computing xor t-privately, t n?2, using a trusted party Q. Then, the support of Q, S, has at least 2 t vectors.
Proof: By contradiction, assume that the trusted party has only 2 t ?1 distinct vectors in its support set.
By Lemma 4, there are t?1 processors, P i1 ; : : :; P it?1 , such that if each processor P ij receives a certain value s ij from Q, the trusted party, then they uniquely determine that the entire vector used by Q iss. Thus, in this event (which occurs with positive probability), the coalition of the t ? 1 players knows all the values that Q distributed. Intuitively, in such a case, the protocol becomes deterministic. The impossibility result follows from the fact that there is no deterministic 1-private protocol for 3 or more parties (see KR94] ). To be more formal, consider the protocol for n ? (t ? 1) 3 players that is obtained by running P while giving each P ij input 0, and each P i (in this set and out of it) the corresponding coordinate ofs. It can be seen that the modi ed protocol is deterministic (the random choices were xed), 1-private (using the t-privacy of P) and always correct. (Full details are provided in the proof of Theorem 4 below.)
The above theorem implies that in the trusted party model t random bits are required by the trusted-party to allow t-private computation of xor. This is quite close to the O(t log(n=t)) upper bound proven for this model. The same lower bound holds for the standard model (where no such trusted party exists):
Theorem 4: Let P be a protocol for n 3 players that allows computing xor t-privately, t n ? 2. Then, P requires at least t random bits. Proof: Suppose, towards a contradiction, that P uses at most (over all inputs and all random choices) d t?1 random bits. One of the di culties in transforming the proof from the trusted-party model (Theorem 3) to the standard model, is the possibility that in di erent executions di erent players toss the coins. Assume, without loss of generality, that0 is an input on which d random bits are used in some executions, and that P 1 ; : : :; P s is a set of s d players which in some execution (on input0) make all the d random choices. Denote by R 1 ; : : :; R s possible random choices for them in such an execution.
We will construct a new protocol P 0 that computes xor for n ? s 3 players, P s+1 ; : : :; P n , 1-privately and deterministically. It is well known that such a protocol does not exist (see KR94] ) and hence we will get the desired contradiction. To do so, let P s+1 ; : : :; P n (who wish to compute the xor ofx 0 = (x s+1 ; : : :; x n )) execute the protocol P onx = (0; : : :; 0; x s+1 ; : : :; x n ); in addition, if any of these players needs to send a message to one of P 1 ; : : :; P s he informs its value to everybody, and if he needs to receive a message from one of P 1 ; : : :; P s he computes it himself by taking 0 as the input of each of them, the corresponding R i (as xed above), and the messages they received in previous rounds (which are known to all).
First, we need to prove that P 0 is deterministic; that is, for allx 0 , the players never reach a point in their code that they are required to ip coins and to use it (to be formalized below). Note, that ifx 0 is a 0-vector then so isx. In this case, by the assumptions, none of P s+1 ; : : :; P n ips coins and the whole communication is xed to some vector of values C. The problem is that it is not obvious that this is the case for all vectorsx as above (we will prove that this is the case). Let step 0 be the rst step in which for some input, some of P s+1 ; : : :; P n tosses a coin. In all previous steps the communication is deterministic (for all inputs) which implies that the messages sent are identical to those in C. To see this, suppose this is false and consider the rst step for which on some input P i sends to P j the message 0 and on others he sends 1. Since this is the rst such step, this implies that P i behaves di erently when the inputx 0 is the all-0 vector, and when it is a vector in which only P i and P k (where P k is any player di erent than P i ; P j ; P 1 ; : : :; P s ) have input 1. This implies that in the original protocol, P, the coalition P 1 ; : : :; P s and P j (which is of size at most t) could be able to distinguish between these two inputs (when P 1 ; : : :; P s have randomness R 1 ; : : :; R s ). But, as in both cases they have the same input and the output is the same, they should not be able to do that. So we proved that up to step step 0 for all inputs the communication is identical to C. Now, by assumption, in this step some players toss coins and \use" them. That is, for some inputx 0 , some player P i sends to some player P j either a 0 or 1 both with positive probability (it can be seen that it must be that x i = 1). Again, as so far the communication was the same for all inputs, this is true for the vector in which only P i and P k have 1, which again allows the coalition P 1 ; : : :; P s and P j to distinguish between0 (on which the communication must be C) and this vector (on which, with positive probability, the communication is di erent than C). Thus, contradicting the t-privacy of the original protocol. This implies that indeed P 0 is deterministic. Now, as we know that no player will be required to toss coins in P 0 , we can claim that P 0 is correct; each execution of it on input x s+1 ; : : :; x n has a corresponding execution of the original protocol (on input 0; : : :; 0; x s+1 ; : : :; x n and with randomness R 1 ; : : :; R s and where none of P s+1 ; : : :; P n tosses coins) which by assumption is always correct. Note that the inputs given to P 1 ; : : :; P s contribute nothing to the outcome (had we choose di erent inputs for these players we may need to ip the outcome).
Finally, we claim that P 0 is 1-private; the (deterministic) view in P 0 of any single player P j in fP s+1 ; : : :; P n g is the same as the view of P 1 ; : : :; P s together with P j in the original protocol (where P 1 ; : : :; P s have inputs 0; : : :; 0 and randomness R 1 ; : : :; R s ). Note that inputs for which we have the privacy requirement in P 0 remain so if we extend them with the inputs of P 1 ; : : :; P s . Hence, the 1-privacy of P 0 follows from the t-privacy of P. Remark: In fact the statement shown by the proof is stronger than what is required in few ways: (1) it shows that for every input there is an execution that uses at least t random bits; (2) it shows that not only t coins must be tossed but that the number of players that toss coins has to be at least t (even if each of them tosses many coins); and (3) it shows that the support of S is large no matter what is the probability distribution over S.
A Parallel Construction
In this section we show how immune sample spaces can be constructed in parallel. Obviously, the randomized construction (Section 2.2) can be parallelized. Our goal however, is to show how this can be done deterministically. That is, by an NC-algorithm.
To do so, we construct a matrix M as in Section 2.3 but this time in a column-by-column fashion. Also, we think of each set T i as a vector in f0; 1g n , which is simply its characteristic vector. Note that if we nd a column M j 2 f0; 1g n such that the inner product hT i ; M j i is 1 (i.e., 1 = P n
then T i has the desired property that P j2Ti M j 6 =0.
We will use for the construction -bias spaces. These are sets B f0; 1g n of size polynomial in n and 1= such that, for every x 2 f0; 1g n (and in particular every T i ), Pr b2B (hx; bi = 1) is at least 1 2
? .
These spaces were studied in NN90, AGHP90], which in particular proved that they can be constructed in NC 
Proof:
The proof is similar to the proof of Lemma 3, except that now the number of relevant sets for each row k can obviously be bounded by d (instead of m). Since 2` d + 1,`columns are sucient.
Schulman S92] considered the following problem: given sets H 1 ; : : :; H p construct a space whose projection on every H i yields a uniform distribution. Using our constructions, we get the following corollary, which is a new proof for the results of S92]: 
Given sets H 1 ; : : :; H p de ne T = fTj for some i; T H i g. Observe that if a space is immune to the sets of T then its projection on every H i is uniform. Again this is a standard fact (see, e.g., AS92]); to see this, consider a set H i . When specifying the probability of the parity for each T H i , we essentially determine the Fourier transform of the distribution, hence we uniquely determine the probability distribution over H i . Since we require that all 10 The constructionobtained is di erent than that of S92]. In S92] the vectors of the space are constructed directly without going through, what we call, the generating matrix. We believe that the construction based on our approach is somewhat simpler.
11 Both this corollary and Lemma 6 are not used in the present paper and appear here only to exemplify the power of our construction. the sets are immune it implies that the probability distribution over the H i is the uniform one. The two parts of the corollary now follow from Lemma 3 and Lemma 6 respectively.
It is sometimes useful to have a sample space which is not only immune to a single test T i but is t-wise immune; namely, if we take k t tests then we get each combination of the k parities with probability 2 ?k . This of course is possible only if the tests are independent (for example, if T 1 and T 2 are disjoint sets, then the result of the parity test T 3 = T 1 T 2 is always the sum of the parity tests T 1 and T 2 ). We show here how to transform our construction into a t-wise immune sample space.
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Let T = T 1 T 2 : : : T k denotes the set of elements that appear in an even number of sets in T 1 ; : : :; T k . This operation can best be viewed by looking at the characteristic vectors of the sets. Then, the characteristic vector of T is the sum (over GF(2 n )) of the characteristic vectors of T 1 ; : : :; T k . We say that T 1 ; : : :; T k are independent if no subset of them gives T = ; (alternatively, if their characteristic vectors are linearly independent over GF(2 n )). There exists a sample space which is t-wise immune to the sets T 1 ; : : :; T m . The size of the space is bounded by the number of di erent sets of the form T i1 : : : T ik (where k t) which is at most O( P t i=0 ? m i ) = O(m t ). This space can be constructed in time polynomial in n and m t .
